Liberation from Social Kantianism

I've at last been liberated from the deontological ethical system from which, I think, suffering is widespread. Put simply, the most common version of this ethical system (from my observation) says that we should not do anything in public that creates a "stir" - except in very exceptional circumstances (so it's not quite absolutist).

My particular ailment was an ethics that wedded some rules of that ethics to a prohibition against doing acts in public or in private that would be contrary to my image of a wise, self-aware, modest, other-regarding scholar with a healthy sense of the contingency of his own beliefs. In other words, I had a virtue-ethics-like What Would My Scholar Do? test. I think this is a remnant of my unusual childhood idolization of intellectuals - before I had any understanding of them and their thought processes. Thus even my answers to my What Would My Scholar Do? test were probably wrong.

I was constantly plagued by the thought that I "should" or "shouldn't" do something, without any particular reason why this was the case except the command of experience or the graven image of my scholar. Upon a consequentialist education, one can easily rationalize both these systems: First, we don't want to create a "stir" because this would be an especially bad outcome (hurting many people). Second, I don't want to contradict the principles of scholarly life because this life is, after all, my aspiration (my end). And no single action can be more important than that ultimate end.

But the simple fact is that consequentialism is just more complicated than that.

Now I am free to think of my end freely, without a crowd of convenient means that are simply ruled out. For example, I can try to win a debate round without ruling out a million small ways of arguing - such as attacking an argument in a rhetorical manner, as well as an analytical manner, when I know that will be more persuasive. For example, I can inject my comments into a seminar discussion without worrying that I will distract or muddy the discussion. I just need to engage in order to learn - and hopefully, in the long term, do a little less muddying when I say my piece. I knew this a long time ago, but I saw some virtue in remaining principled, with high standards. Indeed, I distinctly remember Matt Wansley commenting to me my sophomore year: "I always admire that you're a principled person. Some of your principles are bit weird and irrational, but I like that you stick to them." I didn't like it then, and I don't like it now.

So I'm free to reject my irrational principles. I can, according to Shelly Kagan's description of rationality, reject the principles that are externally imposed on me (or imposed on me through faulty reasoning). This doesn't mean I can use any means, because very often there is a consequentialist reason for why a certain means just won't do. But I must be able to articulate that reason before I act on my mere impressions about virtue and creating a stir.

In short, I am liberated.